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There is little doubt that the UK 
agri- food sector will be one of the 
sectors most seriously affected by 
Brexit. Not only is it dependent on 
trade relations both with the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and with the Rest 
of the World (RoW), but it is also a 
sector dependent on migrant labour, 
and is heavily subsidised and 
regulated under the present Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (CAP). The 
current Westminster government 
through its Department for Environ-
ment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) 
and the UK Treasury is trying to 
reassure British farmers and the 
larger public that Brexit is a once in a 
life- time opportunity to replace the 
‘fundamentally flawed’ CAP with ‘our 
own national food policy, our own 
agriculture policy, …, shaped by our 
own collective interests’ (Secretary of 
State Michael Gove, 2018). Moreover, 
UK farmers are guaranteed to receive 
the same level of subsidy (as under 
the CAP) until the end of 2022. 
Despite these efforts, the lack of 
concrete policy decisions and the 
uncertainty that surrounds the terms 
of negotiations with the EU make UK 
farmers and rural communities very 
anxious indeed. Thus, how future 
UK Agricultural Policy (UKAP) will 
look after the country leaves the EU 
and what the economic and social 
implications of Brexit will be, remain 
open to debate and academic 
research.
A few notable studies (Boulanger and 
Philippidis, 2015; Bradley and Hill, 
2017; Davis et al., 2017; Van Berkum 
et al., 2016) have assessed the 
potential effects of exit on the UK agri-
cultural sector using different scenarios 
and assumptions. However, there 
remains an absence of more compre-
hensive research including analysis of 
variation in the effects of different 
trade and domestic policy options 
across heterogeneous farm popula-
tions and, regionally, among the UK 
devolved administrations.
This gap is addressed in a current 
Brexit priority grant project – How 
might UK Agriculture Thrive or 
Survive? – funded by the UK Econom-
ic and Social Research Council (ESRC). 
Specifically, the project aims to 
estimate the possible macro- , sector- 
and farm- level effects of selected trade 
and domestic policy scenarios for UK 
agriculture. To achieve these aims, 
projections from macro- sector models 
are linked to a series of farm models 
which are then used to evaluate the 
micro- economic impacts of Brexit 
scenarios on farm businesses and 
households. Further details on the 
models and interactions between 
them are provided in Box 1. This The UK agri-food sector will be one of the sectors most seriously affected by Brexit.
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“L’élimination des paiements directs affectera la plupart des 
entreprises agricoles … 
mais de nombreuses 
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article focuses on some preliminary 
findings from this ongoing research.
Selected trade and domestic 
policy scenarios
The scenarios are chosen to represent 
a broad range of feasible options for: i) 
trade relations with the EU and the 
Rest of World; ii) domestic UK policy 
for direct payments to farmers (cur-
rently the Basic Payments Scheme). In 
addition to the main analysis, sensitiv-
ity analysis (not reported here) has 
been undertaken with regards to two 
other major conditioning factors for 
the economic effects of Brexit policy 
on UK Agriculture: i) restrictions on 
migrant labour; and ii) the sterling 
exchange rate, both with the Euro and 
with the US dollar. We acknowledge, 
however, that restricting our attention 
in this way ignores Brexit implications 
and options for both environmental 
policies and also for market, product 
and process regulations.
We modelled three selected trade 
policy scenarios (Table 1), designed to 
cover the range of likely outcomes of 
the UK–EU negotiations and which 
were discussed and agreed with 
relevant stakeholders: (i) UK–EU Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA); (ii) Unilateral 
Trade Liberalisation (UTL); and (iii) 
return to World Trade Organisation 
tariffs (EU Tariffs Schedule – WTO).
Brexit clearly implies that the UK, and 
the devolved administrations, will 
need to reconsider the framework of 
agricultural policy currently deter-
mined by the EU. At present, under the 
CAP, UK farmers receive public 
support through both Pillar 1 (area 
based payments and within Scotland a 
limited amount of coupled support in 
the beef and sheep sectors) and Pillar 
2 (e.g. agri- environmental schemes 
and less favoured area payments). 
Following Brexit, we consider the 
likelihood of continued support 
payments to UK farmers from two 
perspectives. On one hand, there is 
considerable pressure from farming 
Box 1: Overview of the models used
The models used in the project are integrated as follows. First, an agriculture-specific variant of the well- known Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) multi- region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is used, called Defra- Tap 
(Philippidis et al., 2007; Philippidis and Kitou, 2012). The CGE model is calibrated to Release 9 of the GTAP database 
(Narayanan et al., 2015) with information on cost and demand structures, gross bilateral trade data, transport costs and trade 
protection for 57 activities in 140 regions, for the year 2011. In explicitly representing the input- output relationships among 
various sectors, the model is well suited to assessing the knock- on impacts on the wider economy given a policy change in 
a particular sector. Specifically in this project, it is used to estimate impacts of the Brexit scenarios focusing on the wider 
macro economy and the factor markets.
Second, applying common scenario assumptions, disaggregated commodity- level projections for prices, production and 
trade flows are estimated with the UK- FAPRI partial equilibrium model (Feng et al., 2017; Moss et al., 2009). Unlike the CGE 
model, the partial equilibrium model focuses on a specific sector (agriculture in this case), assuming the knock- on impacts 
on the wider economy and, hence, the feedback effect on the sector studied are negligible. Building on this assumption, the 
model provides more detailed and disaggregated results within the sector, hence, the name ‘sectoral model’.
Third, the CGE and UK- FAPRI models are linked to a series of representative farm models. Results from the aggregate models 
underpin key assumptions in the farm models, the values of which are treated as exogenous. These include factor price 
projections (e.g. land rents and wages) from the CGE model and output and direct- input price projections from the UK- FAPRI 
model. The farm- level modelling comprises detailed financial simulations for 2,803 businesses in the Farm Business Surveys of 
England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Furthermore, they are weighted using agricultural census data, so they represent 
some 90,000 commercial farms accounting for more than 90 per cent of UK agricultural output. To control for inter- year 
variability, baseline management account data used for each farm are three- year averages for 2013/14–2015/16.
Table 1: Selected UKAP trade scenarios
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groups for support in some form, and 
indeed the current payments have 
been guaranteed until 2022. On the 
other, there will also be significant 
pressure from both the Treasury and 
other spending Ministers to reduce and 
eventually eliminate these payments 
(particularly the direct support), 
releasing funds perhaps for other 
purposes, e.g. ecosystem services and 
rural development. Hence, we assume 
two domestic policy scenarios: (i) 
direct payments retained as currently 
under the CAP, and (ii) a gradual 
elimination of direct payments over a 
five- year period (2020–25). We also 
assume that Pillar 2- type payments will 
continue after Brexit at current levels. 
Since the eventual production effects 
of these two UK domestic policy 
options should be rather similar as far 
as our macro and sector models are 
concerned, we present results for the 
three trade scenarios, each with (+) 
and without (–) direct payments, in 
order to distinguish between the trade 
and domestic policy effects.
The selected trade and domestic 
policy scenarios are modelled against 
a baseline scenario which assumes 
that the UK remains fully integrated in 
the Single Market and the Customs 
Union, with direct payments in place. 
The analysis covers the projection 
period 2017 to 2026, with Brexit 
scenarios beginning in 2019, where 
the outcomes in the final year (2026) 
represent the longer- run projections of 
the consequences of the scenarios.
Selected key findings
Our CGE modelling shows that in all 
scenarios considered, Brexit has a 
negative impact on UK Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP). A reversion to 
WTO under most favoured nation 
(MFN) tariff schedules reduces it the 
most, circa 0.4 per cent per annum on 
average, whereas UTL reduces it the 
least, 0.22 per cent per annum on 
average (Table 2). Thus, in macroeco-
nomic terms, the impacts that arise 
from the scenarios are relatively small. 
This is because average tariffs in the 
wider economy between the UK and 
EU, as well as the assumed trade cost 
increases, are only moderate for the 
majority of UK economic activities. In 
those scenarios where larger tariffs 
and/or trade cost shocks occur, these 
effects are typically restricted to 
agri-food industries, which constitute 
only a small share of the UK GDP. 
Despite the small impacts at the 
macroeconomic level, considerable 
potential impacts are expected, both 
for the agri- food sector and food 
consumers in terms of retail price 
changes, as elaborated below.
At the sector level, there are also poten-
tial impacts on farm production and 
market prices confirmed by both the 
CGE and FAPRI models. Trade 
negotiations with the EU and the RoW 
will be paramount, and the impact of 
trade agreements on the sector is 
conditioned by the degree of trade 
competitiveness (i.e. relative tariffs) 
and trade openness. It also depends on 
the status of the sub- sector concerned 
(e.g. beef, sheep, dairy, pigs, poultry, 
wheat and barley) and whether the UK 
is a net importer or net exporter of 
specific commodities. Even a relatively 
‘soft’ Brexit, a bespoke free trade 
agreement with the EU close to current 
arrangements (i.e. FTA+), would create 
some disruption to trade flows, albeit 
with estimated market impacts that are 
The lack of concrete policy decisions and the uncertainty that surrounds the terms of 
negotiations with the EU make UK farmers and rural communities very anxious indeed.
Table 2: CGE general effects on UK GDP, agri- food output and prices (cf. 
baseline projection 2026)
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relatively small. The market impacts are 
mainly due to the introduction of an 
assumed increase in UK and EU trade 
facilitation costs (to capture the UK’s 
loss of access to the single market), 
which leads to changes in the UK terms 
of trade. However, they are mitigated 
by the removal of UK- RoW tariffs (UTL 
scenario) or amplified by the adoption 
of the current EU schedule of WTO 
MFN tariffs (WTO scenario). In the case 
of products where the UK is a net 
importer (e.g. beef) the imposition of 
tariffs reduces the competitiveness of 
the imported product resulting in 
higher domestic producer prices in the 
UK. The converse applies for products 
where the UK is a net exporter (e.g. 
lamb) to the EU.
Additionally, the CGE model (Table 2) 
confirms an increase in the UK farm 
gate prices for primary agriculture 
and retail prices for processed food 
under WTO. For example, under 
WTO+, estimates for the meat sector 
and food processing are particularly 
high compared with the baseline, 
e.g. 7.3 per cent and 3.7 per cent 
increase in retail prices, respectively. 
However, the CGE and FAPRI price 
projections are broadly similar after 
taking account of differences in retail 
and producer prices and aggregation 
of prices. These price effects are 
consequences of the adjustment to 
WTO MFN tariffs on EU trade and the 
imposition of UK and EU trade 
facilitation costs (4 per cent for crops 
and 8 per cent for livestock). The 
removal of direct payments (WTO–) 
increases the equivalent per unit 
cost of agricultural production, 
hence resulting in further price 
increases.
A unilateral trade liberalisation (UTL) 
decision to remove agricultural import 
tariffs from the RoW and from the EU, 
would see domestic producer prices 
fall markedly for all products, particu-
larly for beef and sheep. Specifically, 
The impact of Brexit on UK agriculture will be far from uniform.
Figure 1: FAPRI – Percentage change in UK producer commodity prices (cf. 
baseline 2026)
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Many beef and sheep farms would struggle to survive, as they tend to be much more 
reliant on direct support.
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under UTL+, the FAPRI model 
estimates a large increase in imports 
from RoW for the UK beef sector. This 
reflects the highly competitive nature 
of overseas suppliers (e.g. Brazil and 
Australia), and results in the domestic 
producer beef price falling close to 
world levels, by 42 per cent (Figure 1). 
Interestingly, removing direct pay-
ments hardly affects prices further in 
both models, since the reductions in 
domestic quantities produced are 
offset by changes in trade flows.
Our farm modelling also shows some 
interesting results regarding the 
distribution of farm business income 
across the devolved administrations 
and by farm type (Figures 2 and 3) and 
the importance of retaining and 
eliminating direct payments (Figures 4 
and 5). As with other EU Member 
States, direct payments are a crucial 
component of farm business income in 
the UK. Thus, while some farm 
businesses will survive, many might 
not. The negative impact on farm 
business income is reflected across all 
trade scenarios, especially UTL with or 
without direct payments (DPs). Average 
farm income varies significantly across 
the devolved administrations and by 
farm type, with most farms worse off 
(relative to the baseline) under all 
scenarios but one, WTO+. Noticeably, 
under this scenario dairy farms will 
particularly benefit as their average 
farm income could almost triple 
compared to the baseline scenario. Beef 
and sheep farms will be the most 
affected under UTL–. Indeed, our 
extreme free trade scenario leads to 
some striking results regarding farm 
income distribution. Whereas 15–20 per 
cent of the farms were not making any 
money at all (even in the baseline 
scenario), this rises to 45 per cent under 
the UTL scenario with direct payments 
still in place (UTL+). The elimination of 
direct payments further increases this 
figure to 70 per cent (UTL–).
Discussion and concluding 
remarks
Our preliminary results show that Brexit 
would have significant implications for 
UK agriculture, a sector with strong 
trade links to the EU and reliance on 
CAP income support. Trade scenario 
Figure 2: Estimated average farm income by country and scenario (2026)
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Figure 3: Estimated average farm income by scenario and farm type, UK 
(2026)
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While some farm businesses will survive Brexit, many might not.
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effects depend on the net trade position, 
and/or world prices. Under a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with the EU, agricul-
tural impacts are relatively modest. By 
contrast, unilateral removal of import 
tariffs (UTL) has significant negative 
impacts on prices, production and 
incomes. Adoption of the EU’s WTO 
tariff schedule for all imports (including 
from the EU) favours some net importer 
sectors (e.g. dairy) and harms exporter 
sectors (e.g. sheep). These trade effects, 
however, might be overshadowed by 
the exchange rate and possible labour 
market changes and other non- tariff 
barriers (not addressed in this article).
Given the dependence of many UK 
farms on direct payments, their 
removal, predictably, worsens the 
negative impacts of new trade 
arrangements and offsets positive 
impacts. Indeed, the elimination of 
direct payments will affect most 
farm businesses but the magnitude 
varies by enterprise and devolved 
administration. Arable and dairy 
farms may be relatively unaffected, 
but many beef and sheep farms 
would struggle to survive, as they 
tend to be much more reliant on 
direct support. If direct payments 
are to be removed under future UK 
agricultural policy, then resulting 
financial pressures may accelerate 
structural and land- use change, 
including agricultural land abandon-
ment in more marginal locations 
(e.g. in Scotland). Hence, the impact 
of Brexit on UK agriculture will be 
far from uniform. Despite some 
differences regarding the relative 
changes in prices and output across 
the sector and commodities, our 
estimates are broadly in line with 
the studies of van Berkum et al. 
(2016), Davis et al. (2017) and 
Bradley and Hill (2017).
Our models do not address the 
economic impacts of Brexit on the 
supply chain per se, hence, it is 
difficult to predict exactly how these 
trade and domestic policy scenarios 
will affect the entire UK food supply 
chain, particularly consumers. 
However, UK food prices would 
depend not only on the tariff schedule 
that the UK will put in place and its 
impact on import supply (hence the 
importance of trade negotiations), but 
also on the value of the pound in 
foreign exchange markets. Continuing 
with EU level tariffs (without a free 
trade deal with the EU) would 
increase domestic food prices, 
particularly affecting those who spend 
a higher proportion of their dispos-
able income on food; but ‘a hard’ 
Brexit (no deal with EU) and low (or 
no) tariffs could leave food prices 
unchanged or lower, so benefiting 
consumers, at least in the short term. 
Figure 5: Farm income distribution by scenario without DPs, UK (2026)
–100,000
–50,000
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95
Fa
rm
 B
us
in
es
s 
In
co
m
e (
£
)
Base FTA– UTL– WTO–
Proportion of Farms
“Elimination of direct payments will affect most farm 
businesses … but many 
beef and sheep farms 
would struggle to 
survive.
”
Figure 4: Farm income distribution by scenario with DPs, UK (2026)
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Additionally, any exports from the UK 
to the EU and RoW would be required 
to meet the product and provenance 
standards of the importing country, 
while we might also expect to see 
pressure from UK citizens for the 
application of British standards to 
imports from elsewhere. Trade (tariff 
and non- tariff) barriers also involve 
higher administrative costs which 
could disrupt the agri- food supply 
chain, at least for a period. While the 
UK would be free and more flexible to 
negotiate new trade deals worldwide, 
given their importance and complex-
ity this could be a lengthy and painful 
process. The Government seems 
confident that it will reconcile all of 
the above (see its response to the 
House of Lords, Defra, 2017), but who 
pays the bill remains to be seen.
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Summary
Brexit: How Will UK 
 Agriculture Fare? 
 
There is little doubt that Brexit 
would have significant 
implications for UK agriculture, a 
sector with strong trade links to the 
EU and strong reliance on CAP 
income support. This article reports 
preliminary results from employing a 
Computable General Equilibrium 
Model, a Partial Equilibrium Model 
and Farm Level Models to explore 
selected trade and domestic policy 
scenarios post- Brexit. These allow for 
the estimation of changes in producer 
prices, production and farm incomes 
against a baseline scenario of 
continued EU membership. Under a 
Free Trade Agreement with the EU, 
agricultural impacts are relatively 
modest. By contrast, unilateral 
removal of import tariffs has 
significant negative impacts on prices, 
production and incomes. Adoption of 
the EU’s WTO tariff schedule for all 
imports favours net importers (e.g. 
dairy) and harms net exporters (e.g. 
sheep). Given the strong dependence 
of most UK farms on direct payments, 
their removal worsens negative 
impacts of new trade arrangements 
and offsets positive impacts. Impacts 
vary across different types and sizes of 
farm, but also regionally. However, 
the period of adjustment to new trade 
and domestic policy conditions may 
prove very challenging for a large 
number of farm businesses.
Brexit : Comment 
l’agriculture du 
Royaume- Uni va- t- elle 
réagir?
Il ne fait guère de doute que le 
Brexit aura des répercussions 
importantes sur l’agriculture du 
Royaume- Uni, un secteur qui 
entretient des liens commerciaux 
solides avec l’Union européenne et qui 
dépend fortement du soutien au 
revenu de la PAC. Cet article présente 
les résultats préliminaires de 
l’utilisation d’un modèle d’équilibre 
général calculable, d’un modèle 
d’équilibre partiel et de modèles au 
niveau de la ferme pour explorer une 
sélection de scénarios de politique 
commerciale et intérieure après le 
Brexit. Ces scénarios permettent 
d’estimer les variations des prix à la 
production, de la production et des 
revenus agricoles par rapport à un 
scénario de référence de maintien de 
l’adhésion à l’Union européenne. Dans 
le cadre d’un accord de libre- échange 
avec l’Union, les impacts sur 
l’agriculture sont relativement 
modestes. En revanche, la suppression 
unilatérale des droits de douane à 
l’importation a des effets négatifs 
importants sur les prix, la production 
et les revenus. L’adoption de la liste 
tarifaire de l’Union européenne à 
l’OMC pour toutes les importations 
favorise les importateurs nets (par 
exemple le secteur laitier) et nuit aux 
exportateurs nets (par exemple le 
secteur ovin). Compte tenu de la forte 
dépendance de la plupart des 
exploitations britanniques vis- à- vis des 
paiements directs, leur suppression 
aggrave les effets négatifs des 
nouveaux accords commerciaux et 
neutralise les effets positifs. Les 
impacts varient selon les types et les 
tailles de fermes, mais aussi au niveau 
régional. Cependant, la période 
d’ajustement à de nouvelles conditions 
de commerce et de politique intérieure 
peut s’avérer très difficile pour un 
grand nombre d’entreprises agricoles.
Brexit: Wie wird es der 
Landwirtschaft des Ver-
einigten Königreichs 
ergehen?
Es besteht kaum ein Zweifel, dass 
ein Brexit erhebliche 
Auswirkungen auf die britische 
Landwirtschaft hätte. Gründe hierfür 
sind die engen Handelsverbindungen 
zur EU und die große Abhängigkeit 
von der im Rahmen der GAP 
gewährten Einkommensstützung. 
Dieser Artikel zeigt die vorläufigen 
Ergebnisse ausgewählter handels- und 
innenpolitischer Post- Brexit- Szenarien. 
Sie wurden mit Hilfe eines allgemeinen 
Gleichgewichtsmodells, einem 
partiellen Gleichgewichtsmodell und 
mit Betriebsmodellen erstellt. 
Hierdurch können Änderungen in den 
Erzeugerpreisen, in der Produktion 
und im landwirtschaftlichen 
Einkommen im Vergleich zu einem 
Basisszenario mit fortbestehender 
EU- Mitgliedschaft abgeschätzt werden. 
Bei einem Freihandelsabkommen mit 
der EU sind die Auswirkungen auf die 
Landwirtschaft relativ gering. Dagegen 
hat eine unilaterale Abschaffung von 
Importzöllen erhebliche negative 
Auswirkungen auf die Preise, 
Produktion und Einkommen. Eine 
Einführung der EU- WTO- Zölle auf alle 
Importe begünstigt Nettoimporteure 
(z. B. Milchprodukte) und schadet 
Nettoexporteure (z. B. Schafe). 
Aufgrund der großen Abhängigkeit der 
meisten Betriebe im Vereinigten 
Königreich von den Direktzahlungen 
würde deren Abschaffung die 
negativen Effekte neuer 
Handelsregelungen verstärken und 
positive Auswirkungen aufheben. Je 
nach Art und Größe der Betriebe und 
auch je nach Region variieren die 
Auswirkungen. Die Übergangsphase, 
bei der die Anpassung an neue 
handels- und innenpolitische 
Rahmenbedingungen erfolgt, könnte 
sich jedoch für zahlreiche 
landwirtschaftliche Betriebe als sehr 
schwierig erweisen.
